Randomness, Heterogeneity and Population Dynamics
Jürgen Jost and Wei Li
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Submission date: 29. Jan. 2013
PACS-Numbers: 89.65.Gh, 87.23.Ge, 89.90.+n
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We investigate the emergent population dynamics of an iterated game in which members of two antagonistic populations are randomly paired in each round. The basic setting is symmetric between these two populations, but this symmetry can be broken by giving the members of the two populations access to different strategy spaces or by assigning different values to parameters determining the composition or the evolution of the populations. In particular, we can investigate the effects of population diversity or stochasticity of the individual agents' actions, both for the competition between agents inside a population and for their benefits or disadvantages for the population as a whole.