Body-representation and self-consciousness: from embodiment to minimal phenomenal selfhood
- Thomas Metzinger (Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, Mainz, Germany)
Abstract
As a philosopher, I am interested in the relationship between body representation and the deep structure of self-consciousness. How, precisely, does one describe the grounding relations holding between different levels of embodiment? In analogy to the "symbol grounding problem" one might also call this the "self grounding problem", the problem of describing the principles as well as the mechanics by which a system's phenomenal self-model (PSM; cf. Metzinger 2003; 2007a) is anchored in low-level physical dynamics. My specific epistemic goal in this lecture will be the simplest form of phenomenal self-consciousness: What exactly are the essential non-conceptual, pre-reflexive layers in conscious self-representation? What constitutes a minimal phenomenal self? Conceptually, I will defend the claim that agency is not part of the metaphysically necessary supervenience-basis for bodily self-consciousness. Empirically, I will draw on recent research focusing on out-of-body experiences (OBEs) and full-body illusions (FBIs). I will then proceed to sketch a new research program and advertise a new research target: "Minimal Phenomenal Selfhood", ending with an informal argument for the thesis that agency or "global control", phenomenologically as well as functionally, is not a necessary condition for self-consciousness.
- Thomas Metzinger. Being no one: the self-model theory of subjectivity. A Bradford book. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2003.
- Thomas Metzinger. The ego tunnel: the science of the mind and the myth of the self. Basic Books, New York, 2009.
- Thomas Metzinger. Self Models. <link http: www.scholarpedia.org article self_models external>Scholarpedia journal, 2 (10):4174, 2007.
- Bigna Lenggenhager, Tej Tadi, Thomas Metzinger, and Olaf Blanke. Video ergo sum: manipulating bodily self-consciousness. Science, 317(5841):1096-1099, 2007.
- Olaf Blanke and Thomas Metzinger. Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood. Trends in cognitive sciences, 13(1):7-13, 2008.
- Thomas Metzinger. Empirische Perspektiven aus Sicht der Selbstmodell-Theorie der Subjektivität: eine Kurzdarstellung mit Beispielen. <link http: www.mis.mpg.de fileadmin pdf conf-ei2013_metzinger_fub_2012.pdf internal>Technical report, 2012.
