Abstract for the talk on 27.04.2017 (14:00 h)Social Systems Seminar
Christian Hilbe (Institute of Science and Technology Austria)
Extortion and cooperation in repeated games
27.04.2017, 14:00 h, MPI für Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften Leipzig, A3 02 (Leon-Lichtenstein-SR)
Social dilemmas are situations in which individuals have an incentive to defect at the expense of other group members. Fortunately, when such situations occur repeatedly, reciprocal strategies like Tit-for-Tat can resolve the social dilemma. However, William Press and Freeman Dyson, a computer scientist and a theoretical physicist, have recently shown that repeated interactions also allow individuals to extort their peers. Using an extortionate strategy, an individual can force the co-player to cooperate, although the individual itself is not fully cooperative. In my talk, I will explain how these strategies work, and I will review recent theoretical and experimental results on when extortion pays. In the end of my talk, I will also briefly discuss the impact of a player's memory on the prospects of cooperation in repeated games.